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Overview 
Since 2003, analysts have conceptualized Iraqi 
politics from the standpoint of the national scene 
in Baghdad. From this perspective, power 
dynamics in Iraq are understood through the 
lens of a national quota-based system (called 
muhassasah in Arabic) that distributes ministries 
and oil revenues across the country’s political 
groups according to ethno-sectarian allotments. 
Ignored in this national-level approach are the 
distinct arenas of political competition beyond 
the capital, where both national and subnational 
political actors struggle for control over local oil 
and gas fields, border crossings, and 
government contracts. This report focuses on 
three of Iraq’s most strategically important 
governorates, Nineveh, Basra, and Diyala. Since 
2003, political parties and their corresponding 
armed forces – in addition to international actors 
such as the US military – have vied for influence 
in the three provinces through locally distinct 
forms of clientelism and violence. The report 
tracks the key shifts in each political 
marketplace between 2003 and the present, 
paying particular attention to the evolving 
usages of violence and flows of political finance. 
Political power at the local level is constituted 
and maintained both through coercion and 
transactional deals. Opportunistic alliances often 
cut across ethno-sectarian lines, defying 
assumptions around post-2003 identity-based 
politics. The primacy of purchasing loyalties over 
providing services has led to poor governance 
and pervasive instability. In the short and 
medium term, the political marketplaces of 
Nineveh, Basra and Diyala are likely to witness 
particularly turbulent dynamics due to the global 
crash in oil prices related to the COVID-19 
pandemic, driving the parties and armed groups 
controlling the three governorates to compete 
more uncompromisingly over non-oil forms of 
revenue generation. In light of such 
developments on the horizon, the newly installed 
government in Baghdad has an ever-
decreasing set of options at its disposal. The 
report concludes with both country-wide and 
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I. Introduction 
Amidst a wave of demonstrations in which state 
security forces killed hundreds of protestors, 
Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdulmahdi agreed to 
resign from the premiership on November 29, 
2019 and pave the way for a new government. 
What followed was a succession of attempts in 
the early months of 2020 to agree upon a slate 
of ministers by multiple prime minister 
designates, first by Mohammed Towfiq Allawi, 
then Adnan Zurfi, and finally Mustafa Kadhimi, 
who was finally sworn in on May 7, 2020 only 
after ceding to the demands of the major 
political blocs over the appointment of ministers. 
As in each previous government formation 
process since 2003, the wrangling over 
ministerial posts has been directly tied to the 
patronage networks of the political parties, which 
rely on control over ministries to secure 
positions and revenues for supporters.1 The 
stakes of maintaining dominance over state 
positions and access to resources have arguably 
never been higher due to the dramatic crash in 
global oil prices coinciding with the global 
reduction of demand related to the COVID-19 
outbreak. Since the mid-2000’s, and especially 
after 2010, Iraq’s oil production increased 
dramatically and oil revenue became the single 
most important source of state revenue and 
political finance.2 Today, Iraq relies on oil sales 
for 90% of its state revenue,3 and the price drops 
already put Iraq 3 billion dollars short of salary 
                                                   
1 See for instance: Shahla Al-Kli, The difficult ordeal of forming a new Iraqi 
government, Middle East Institute, (March 12, 2020). 
https://www.mei.edu/publications/difficult-ordeal-forming-new-iraqi-
government, Renad Mansour, Why is it So Hard for Iraq to Form A 
Government?, Chatham House, (April 25, 2020). 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-it-so-hard-iraq-form-
government, Lahib Higel, On Third Try, a New Government for Iraq, 
International Crisis Group, (May 8, 2020).https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-
east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/third-try-new-government-
iraq, and  Raad Alkadiri, Can Mustafa Kadhimi, the Latest Compromise 
Candidate, Repair Iraq’s Broken System?, LSE/Middle East 
Centre.https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/04/21/can-mustafa-kadhimi-the-
latest-compromise-candidate-repair-iraqs-broken-system/     
2 Oil production in Iraq almost doubled between 2008-2018. See “Iraq’s oil 
production has nearly doubled over the past decade.” 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37973. State revenues are 
not the same as political financing, though they may overlap to a significant 
extent. Political revenue refers to the funds which may be used by political 
elites for patronage, and to buy and rent political allegiances.   
requirements for April 2020 alone. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts 
an oil revenue decrease of 70% for Iraq during 
2020,4 meaning that the political parties will 
be competing for increasingly scarce state 
resources over the months and potentially 
years to come.  
 
Viewed from the perspective of this 
competition over the budget and ministries, 
Iraq’s political marketplace is firmly anchored 
in institutions and flows of revenue at the 
national level. Since 2003, analysts have 
rooted their understanding of Iraqi politics in 
the national scene based in the capital, 
examining the drivers of competition and 
consensus in Iraq through the lens of a quota-
based system (called muhassasah in Arabic) 
that distributes state institutions and 
resources across Iraq’s various ethno-
sectarian and political groups.5 If one’s 
understanding of Iraqi politics is tethered to 
the contestation over quotas, then the 
potential for political turmoil in Iraq waxes and 
wanes according to the willingness of national 
parties to cut mutually agreeable deals and 
establish consensus around the size and the 
allocation of the national pie. Accordingly, 
analysts have often understood the appeal of 
successive Sunni Arab insurgent groups (e.g., 
Al-Qaeda, ISIS) as a function of Sunni Arab 
marginalization in the allocation of state 
3 Chloe Cornish, Iraq’s new prime minster faces daunting task to stabilise 
country, Financial Times, (May 23, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/a4bbfee0-0da7-4cfa-a4a2-853fe6e08223.  
4 Jennifer Gnana, IEA to step up support for Iraq’s power and gas sector, 
The National, (May 17, 2020). https://www.thenational.ae/business/iea-to-
step-up-support-for-iraq-s-power-and-gas-sector-1.1020506  
5 Toby Dodge, Iraq – From War to a New Authoritarianism, (UK: Routledge, 
2014), Renad Mansour, Iraq’s Prime Minister Is Taking Things Slow, 
Foreign Policy, (May 18, 2020).  
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/18/mustafa-al-kadhimi-iraqs-new-
prime-minister-has-a-plan-to-stop-the-chaos/, Redar Visser, The Western 
Imposition of Sectarianism on Iraqi Politics, The Arab Studies Journal, Vol. 
15/16, No. 2/1(Fall 2007/Spring 2008), pp. 83-99,  
Toby Dodge, Iraq and Muhasasa Ta’ifia; the external imposition of 
sectarian politics, The Foreign Policy Centre, (November 12, 2018). 
https://fpc.org.uk/iraq-and-muhasasa-taifia-the-external-imposition-of-
sectarian-politics/ 
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resources and positions.6 Similarly, tensions 
between Baghdad and Erbil have been viewed as 
a result of disagreements between Kurdish 
parties and the Shia blocs over state ministries 
and oil revenues.7  
 
Ignored in this national-level approach are the 
distinct arenas of political struggle beyond the 
capital, where both national and subnational 
actors struggle for control over entire cities, 
provinces, local administrations, oil assets, and 
border crossings. Since 2003, the disintegration 
of the previously centralized state and the 
unleashing of violence across the country has 
contributed to the emergence of multiple 
overlapping centres of power at the level of 
major cities and governorates. These spheres of 
influence share certain political dynamics with 
the national level, but simultaneously operate 
according to unique locally specific dynamics 
and levers of power.  
 
While keeping the national-level as part of the 
analysis, this report shifts the focus to the sub-
national scene and examines the political drivers 
of conflict in three of Iraq’s most unstable 
governorates – Nineveh (Mosul), Basra, and 
Diyala. It is argued that political marketplace in 
Iraq is regionally segmented; even as they are 
part of the national political dynamics, the 
struggle for power in each of these governorates 
takes a different shape depending on the actors 
and assets at play within the local political field. 
Our aim is not to minimize the destabilizing role 
of quota-based politicking at the national level 
but rather to contend that examination of power 
struggles at the subnational level reveals a far 
more turbulent -- and violent -- dynamic of state 
capture. Political parties and their corresponding 
armed forces vie for local hegemony via the 
                                                   
6 Toby Dodge, Zeynep Kaya, Kyra Luchtenberg, Sarah Mathieu-Comtois, Bahra 
Saleh, Christine M. van den Toorn, Andrea Turpin-King and Jessica Watkins, Iraq 
Synthesis Paper: Understanding Drivers of Conflict in Iraq, LSE/Middle East 
Centre, (2018), p. 12, 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90514/1/Iraq%20synthesis%20paper%20understanding%
extraction of state funds, various forms of 
patronage/clientelism, and the usage of force. 
These competitions for power often defy 
assumptions around post-2003 ethno-
sectarian politics in Iraq, as factions within a 
given ethno-sectarian bloc may violently 
compete over assets at the subnational level 
while colluding in the quota-based distribution 
of positions at the national level.  
 
Importantly, a turn to the local or governorate 
level does not involve the adoption of a 
narrow lens of analysis in terms of the actors 
in play. On the contrary, a localized 
understanding of Iraq’s political arena brings 
the role of geopolitics and foreign actors into 
sharper focus. The United States, Iran, the 
British military, and other military/political 
actors have all participated in the 
competitions for power, and are thus viewed 
by different local political actors much in the 
same way as they view one another -- as 
entities backed by cash, weapons, and access 
to various revenue and funding streams. The 
failure of the international community to work 
outside this economy of violence is a major 
reason for its perpetuation. Importantly, 
attention to the complex role of international 
actors at the subnational level undercuts the 
standard policy and media narratives around 
the emergence of violence and conflict after 
2003. Analysts and journalists have too often 
blamed a so-called power vacuum or low 
troop numbers without considering how 
international actors have disrupted or 
mismanaged locally specific political 
dynamics — with often tragic results. 
 
The only political force which has 
meaningfully contested the dominance of the 
20the%20drivers_2018.pdf 
7 International Crisis Group, Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain: On Iraq and 
the Kurds, (2008), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-
and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/oil-soil-toward-grand-bargain-iraq-and-kurds  
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political marketplace is the protest movement, 
comprised of ordinary Iraqis who are forced on a 
daily basis to navigate roads, police stations, and 
government buildings dominated by competing 
parties and militias. Unlike the highly 
consolidated authoritarian regimes toppled 
under the Arab Spring, Iraq’s protestors can 
hardly name all of the political parties and 
militias they hope to eliminate. Their slogans 
against the “parties” (ahzab) simultaneously call 
for the cessation of the politics described in this 
paper — a transactional politics rooted in 
violence, cooptation, and oil-based revenue 
streams.    
 
Sources of Political Finance 
Across the three provinces discussed in this 
study, the flow of political finance is not primarily 
routed through direct bribes and payments but 
rather the extension of state-backed salaries and 
contracts. This is a function of Iraq’s status as a 
country with a large public sector financed by oil 
revenues, which has been almost entirely 
captured by the prevailing political parties and 
militias. Revenues from oil sales across Iraqi 
governorates (with the exception of the Kurdish 
region) are directed into the national coffers, 
which are in turn distributed to party-controlled 
ministries, security agencies, and provincial 
budgets.8 In addition to the national-level 
distributions, provincial governments in the oil-
producing areas in theory receive direct shares 
(5%) of oil profits according to decentralization 
and regional development arrangements, but 
these provincial shares have been intermittent 
depending on shifting political and security 
circumstances.  
 
Regardless of the presence or absence of direct 
provincial-level petrodollar allotments, oil 
                                                   
8 See for instance the distribution of funds across ministries and governorates 
in the 2019 budget: http://www.bayancenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/4529.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3XhWPALfGkCTt3fxRUJMNU
W2aQ7I77qKwcsHnkl-EFS7N2IYkJob__8Rc  
production in a given province generates 
numerous secondary sources of revenue in 
the form of service contracts, public and 
private employment, and smuggling -- all of 
which are controlled by the prevailing political 
parties and militias. Even provinces without 
major oil production witness secondary 
benefits from the sector due to smuggling 
routes, a key source of revenue in the cases of 
Diyala and Nineveh. For this reason, any major 
reduction in oil prices has enormous ripple 
effects across the political marketplace, as oil 
is also the primary fuel for non-oil sources of 
revenue. Sources of political finance across 
the three cases include9:  
 
● Government funds and contracts: The 
political blocs compete over government 
ministries such as Interior, Defense, 
Education, and Health, which have large 
project funds for government contracts at 
the provincial level. In the same vein, they 
compete over posts with influence over 
project approvals such as governorships 
and director generals. The party-backed 
officials then direct contracts to those 
companies over which the party has either 
indirect control (registered through a 
relative or party affiliate) or to those 
companies with which the party and its key 
leaders have established profit sharing 
deals.  
  
● Oil and Gas fields: Parties and militias have 
established themselves within the oil and 
gas sector across Iraq and have gained 
financially from access to service provision 
contracts and job opportunities. This is 
especially the case in Basra, home to Iraq’s 
largest oil and gas fields.  
  
9 Based on interviews with various local officials, administrators, 
observers, and journalists from Basra, Nineveh, and Diyala. March 2019-
February 2020.  
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● Border crossings and ports: Iraq’s border 
crossings and ports are formally under the 
control of the federal government in Baghdad. 
Revenues collected at the ports and border 
crossings are directed to the national budget. 
(As is the case with oil revenues, a share of 
border crossings and ports revenues are 
allocated to the governorates where these 
international gateways are located). However, 
parties and militias have penetrated the staff 
of the border crossings/ports in order to 
secure revenues. Some parties traffic goods 
without paying due taxes while others 
monopolize economic activities around the 
border crossings and ports.  
  
● The International Community: International 
support for security institutions and 
reconstruction projects provide employment 
opportunities and contracts, which have often 
been a target of political parties operating at 
the national and provincial levels.  
 
● Coercive forms of revenue extraction: Parties 
and militias have engaged in coercive forms 
of revenue generation such as extortion from 
businesses, collecting taxes at checkpoints, 
and the predatory stripping of infrastructures 
for steel, parts, and oil resources, which are in 
turn smuggled/sold either within Iraq or 
across borders with Turkey, Iran, Jordan, and 
Syria.  
 
It is worth noting that patronage is most 
commonly distributed through public sector 
employment (in the ministries and provincial 
governments), and political finance is utilized 
(alongside influence and force) in the contests 
around control over such employment. Federal 
payroll allocations increasing nearly every year to 
shore up increasingly fragile popular support, 
and control over a given ministry at the national 
                                                   
10 Interviews with local journalists, civil society activists, and officials in Diyala, 
Basra, and Nineveh, February 2019-February 2020.  
level facilitates appointments within the same 
ministry at the provincial level. Public sector 
employment is itself also a significant source 
of political finance in that positions in both the 
public and private sectors are often sold to 
job seekers at a price (e.g., sources cited job 
seekers paying $6000- $8000 for a low level 
post in various government institutions and 
private sectors such as the oil sector in 
Basra)10, and are extended to supporters 
placed across key ministries in turn approve 
projects directed towards party-affiliated 
companies.  
 
The above breakdown of political finance 
highlights the complex interactions between 
the national and provincial level, as control 
over national ministries is leveraged towards 
the securing of contracts and payroll slots 
locally. In addition to this centre-periphery 
dynamic, this study will simultaneously reveal 
the complex interactions between the regional 
arenas of political power. In other words, 
localized governorate-level political 
marketplaces interact with one another, a fact 
which will become clear in the first case study 
on the Nineveh governorate. As the Erbil-
based KDP has capitalized upon US backing 
to expand its influence into Nineveh’s local 
politics since 2003, the party has retained its 
coherence and discipline within the province’s 
highly turbulent and transactional political 
field, granting the Kurds outsized influence 
over a province with an overwhelming Sunni 
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II. Case Study: Nineveh
Province
Nineveh’s political field has been defined by 
competition between many different actors, 
including Sunni Arab political factions, the two 
main Kurdish blocs, the Americans and the 
coalition forces (the Coalition), the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Iraqi Security Forces, and 
most recently, the Popular Mobilization Forces 
and their political proxies. With the rise and fall of 
ISIS, the barriers to entry into the political arena 
were shattered, ushering in a whole host of new 
political and security actors onto the scene, 
including national Sunni Arab parties with the 
backing of the Shia blocs. Rather than leading a 
coherent movement in Nineveh with popular 
appeal locally, these external Sunni Arab parties 
have formed fluid alliances with one another 
based on achieving short-term goals. From one 
day to the next, the composition of the local 
blocs and the nature of alliances shifts entirely, 
generating a transient political field that often 
leaves even insiders unsure as to who holds 
power. This case explores the gradual 
dissolution of public authority into a 
transactional and transient political marketplace 
between 2003 and the present. 
Political/Security actors 
● Iraqi Security Forces (ISF): The Iraqi Army, the
local and federal police, and other
government special forces.
● Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF): The PMF
refers to the coalition of state-backed Shia-
majority armed groups that coalesced to fight
ISIS. The Shia-majority brigades have allies
among Nineveh’s ethno-sectarian
communities (the Sunni Arabs, Shia Shabacks
and Turkomans, and Christians)
● Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and
affiliated armed groups: The influential Iraqi
Kurdish party plays a key role in shaping
Nineveh’s politics, economy, and security 
due to an extensive local patronage 
network and party discipline. 
● Muhammed Halbousi and political allies:
Muhammed Halbousi is the current
speaker of Iraq’s parliament and the leader
of a Sunni parliamentary coalition allied
with the pro-Iran Shia Binna block.
Halbousi uses his weight as speaker of
parliament to shape Nineveh’s politics and
expand his popular base among Nineveh’s
Sunni Arabs.
● Mahroo’ al-Arabi party: A Sunni Arab party
(allied with the Shia Binaa Coalition) led by
Khamis Khanjar, a wealthy Sunni Arab
politician/businessman. Khanjar and his
ally, Abu Mazin, use their wealth to buy off
the loyalties of local government officials
to secure government contracts in
Nineveh.
● Atta party: A Shia party led by Falih Fayadh,
the chairman of PMF Commission and the
national security advisor to Iraq’s Prime
Minister. Fayadh has been able to integrate
key Sunni Arab tribes and leaders in
Nineveh within the PMF and his Atta party.
● Mutahidoon party:  A Sunni national party
led by Usama Nujaifi, brother of Nineveh’s
former governor Atheel Nujaifi.
Mutahidoon constituted the core of the
Hadbaa coalition that controlled Nineveh’s
local government from 2009 to June 2014.
● Hadbaa coalition: A local (Sunni Arab
majority) political coalition led by Atheel
Nujaifi that won the 2009 local elections
and regained control of Nineveh’s local
government from the Kurds.
● The Iraq Islamic Party (IIP): The IIP was the
only Sunni Arab party that participated in
the political order during the first years
after the invasion, and they operated
largely under Kurdish influence and
control. Alliance with the Kurds damaged
IIP’s reputation and popularity among
7          Iraq’s Political Marketplace at the Subnational Level 
  
Nineveh’s Sunni Arabs. 
● American Forces: American forces’ erratic 
strategy towards Nineveh and reliance on the 
Kurds stoked ethno-sectarian tensions locally. 
The abrupt pull-out of troops in 2011 during a 
time of great political instability in Nineveh 
hastened the disintegration of the security 
situation.  
● Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), ISIS, and other non-
state armed groups: Sunni insurgents grew in 
response American/Kurdish marginalization 
(2003-2008), taking over the western side of 
Mosul city and eventually allying with AQI. 
Militarily and politically defeated in 2008, they 
were able to claw back due to the 
disintegration of the Hadbaa Coalition.   
 
Key shifts in the Political Marketplace 
2003 - 2004: Violent state capture and emergence of 
oligopolistic structure  
In the early days and weeks of the 2003 invasion, 
US forces in charge of Nineveh lacked the 
personnel and weaponry to attempt a takeover 
of the province. Instead the US command relied 
heavily on Kurdish allies, particularly the armed 
wing of the Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP), to assert local control.11 This 
decision on the part of the US military took no 
consideration of the rather predictable local 
political ramifications. The KDP forcefully 
established a security and political presence 
across Mosul City and large swathes of the 
governorate as a whole.12 One KDP official told 
us, “I went into Nineveh’s government offices 
one by one, and if there was an Arabic sign, I’d 
add a Kurdish sign.”13 This systematic strategy 
of state capture set in motion a negative, 
distrustful relationship between the Sunni Arab 
                                                   
11 Mark Oliver, ‘Kurds celebrate fall of Mosul’, The Guardian, (April 11, 2003), 
https://www .theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/11/iraq.markoliver1 
12 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle Over 
Nineveh’, Middle East Report No.9, (September 2009), 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/90-iraq-s-new-battlefront-the-struggle-
over-Nineveh.pdf, p.3  
13 Interview with Khosraw Gorran, KDP leader, Erbil. August 20, 2019 
14 Luke Harding, ‘Mosul descends into chaos as even Museum is looted’, (April 
majority of Nineveh and the Kurdish-American 
alliance.14 The US policy of de-Ba’athification 
(which resulted in the firing of large portions 
of Nineveh’s membership in the federal army 
and local administration) heightened these 
tensions further and simultaneously 
dismantled the organizational capacity of 
powerful Sunni Arabs, shattering any 
remaining barriers in place obstructing 
Kurdish takeover of the province’s formal 
institutions of governance.15 It was in this 
context that an insurgency gradually took 
hold, paving the way for the rise of AQI. By 
2004, Nineveh (particularly Mosul city) was 
fractured into two loosely defined zones of 
influence, with the eastern part under the 
control of the KDP/US alliance and the 
western part under the control of insurgent 
groups and the AQI.16 The KDP enjoyed 
disproportionate control over the formal 
governance/security institutions but had to 
cede territory to insurgents.  
 
2004 - 2008: Introduction of cash-based market 
dynamics 
This is not to say that non-Kurdish 
constituents lacked positions within the 
formal government. The governorship has, for 
instance, always been in the hands of a Sunni 
Arab. As a province with an overwhelming 
Sunni Arab majority, the KDP understood that 
imposing a Kurdish governor would be 
unpalatable to the Americans and to the 
population at large. But given the KDP’s 
access to unparalleled revenue streams (e.g. 
the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing with 
Turkey, longstanding oil smuggling routes 
dating back to the early 1990s, and post-2003 
petrodollars from the state) in addition to 
12, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/12/iraq.arts 
15 ICG, Op.Cit, pp. 4-5. 
16 Eric Hamilton, ‘The Fight for Mosul’, The Institute for the Study of War, 
(March 23, 2008), 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/Iraq%20Rep
ort%208.pdf 
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unmatched organizational cohesiveness, the 
party was able to buy off the loyalties of 
reputable tribal and political figures among those 
Sunni Arabs and ethnic minorities who escaped 
accusations of Ba’athist party membership. The 
governor during this period was always Sunni 
Arab but simultaneously pro-KDP, and the 
Kurdish deputy governor influenced all major 
decisions. In sum, the first instance of a market 
dynamic in Nineveh came in the form of Kurdish 
co-optation of non-Kurdish officials, including 
not only Sunni Arabs but also Christians, Shebak, 
Yazidis and Turkoman.17 Sunni Arab figures have 
guaranteed access to top government positions 
by virtue of the large population  but have 
relatively little access to political finance due to 
the structural disadvantages of the Sunni Arabs 
at the national level. Consequently, they became 
easy targets for co-optation on the part of the 
Kurdish bloc,18 and later the case will show how 
they have become targets of subsequent well-
financed power players.   
 
2008 - 2010: Bifurcation of administrative control, 
redirection of cash-based co-optation 
Up until the provincial elections of 2009, the 
status quo remained in Nineveh. The Kurds 
presided over the governorate administration -- 
both directly and through the co-optation of 
Sunni Arab bureaucrats -- in addition to enjoying 
territorial control of the eastern part of the city. 
The barriers to entry into the local political arena 
were high, and KDP support was needed for any 
political or commercial activity. Their only 
apparent vulnerability was in West Mosul city, 
where Sunni Arab insurgents maintained 
territorial control. In 2007 and 2008, US and Iraqi 
                                                   
17 ICG, Op.Cit, pp.28-31.  
18 A key example of this KDP co-optation of Sunni Arab Mosulawis in this 
period was Duraid Kashmoula, Nineveh’s governor 2004-2009. Kashmoula 
was seen as a puppet of the Kurds/KDP by many Mouslawis.Ned Parker, Iraq 
governor looks back on troubled tenure, Los Angeles Times, (January 22, 
2019).https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-jan-22-fg-iraq-
governor22-story.html?fbclid=IwAR2ETFzzeiVj_GG_IwTqvaIGV6-
XWTcDf7ICWx2R-x1-Zx8GZf3yM1AX0k8    
19 Institute for the Study of War (ISW), ‘Operation Mother of Two Springs’, 
(December 2008), http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-
military operations severely weakened the AQI 
in Nineveh,19 thereby removing their hold over 
the Western portion of the city. Instead of 
playing into the hands of the Kurds, the 
removal of AQI provided breathing room for 
mainstream Sunni Arab political figures to 
come out of the shadows and form robust 
coalitions, as both the US military and Iraqi 
premiere Nouri al-Maliki found a common 
interest in bolstering Sunni Arab political 
representation in Nineveh. As the US and the 
Iraqi government sought to defeat AQI and 
regain control of Mosul, the Coalition and 
Government of Iraq (GoI) lowered barriers to 
entry for Sunni Arab figures to such an extent 
that even former Ba’athists and insurgents 
were tacitly given approval to participate in 
politics. This enabled the Sunni Arab 
nationalist Atheel Nujaifi to bring together a 
broad array of Sunni Arab factions under the 
umbrella of Al-Hadbaa Coalition that included 
many former Ba’athists and insurgents.20 
Hadbaa ran for the 2009 local elections on an 
explicitly anti-Kurdish platform, setting the 
stage for an electoral showdown between the 
two camps.  
 
After winning in a landslide, Nujaifi formed a 
local government to the total exclusion of the 
Kurds.21 Instead of granting Hadbaa total 
influence over the province, this overreach 
resulted in a bifurcation of both territorial and 
administrative authority into two increasingly 
defined spheres, one with a Sunni Arab 
majority and the other with the Kurdish 
majority.22 The provincial government 
controlled Mosul City in addition to western 
mother-two-springs 
20 Kilaas Gleneinkel, ‘The Hadbaa National List’, Niqash, (January 28, 
2009), https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/2368/ 
21 Adel Kamal, ‘New Nineveh Governor Rejects Kurdish Alliance’, (February 
24, 2009), https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/2393/  
22 Interview with Khosraw Goran, former Deputy Governor of Mosul. Erbil, 
August 20, 2019. See also: Ramzy Mardini, ‘Factors Affecting Stability in 
Northern Iraq’, CTC Sentinel, Vol.2, No.8, (August 2009), 
https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uplubordinateoads/2010/06/Vol2Iss8-
Art6.pdf 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and southern Nineveh while the KDP established 
a rival administration in the Nineveh Plains and 
eastern Nineveh.  
 
This division between the two camps led to a 
redirection of the flow of cash and networks of 
co-optation. The Sunni Arab bloc was -- for now -
- much stronger and enjoyed access to 
newfound political powers, and therefore was 
less susceptible to external co-optation. The 
Sunni Arab governor and broader administration 
were no longer exercising their powers as the 
dependent/subordinate partner in an 
asymmetric power relationship with the Kurdish 
political bloc. They were not ‘for sale.’ This is not 
to say however that market dynamics ceased 
altogether. The Sunni bloc was itself riven with 
internal fault lines, as it included a loose 
composition of tribes, minorities, former 
insurgents, former Ba’athists and military 
officers with varied interests. Maintaining the 
support of these factions came at a cost, and 
Nujaifi was constantly engaged in an effort to 
negotiate support with members of his bloc by 
providing them with senior and mid-level 
positions within the local government and 
access to government contracts.23 Meanwhile, 
the Kurdish bloc was internally coherent but 
outward-facing and expansionist at the same 
time, meaning that they redoubled efforts to co-
opt the ethnic minorities within their sphere of 
influence. Mayors and heads of towns of the 
Nineveh plains and other disputed areas pledged 
allegiance to the KRG and KDP forces, going so 
far as to prevent governor Nujaifi from entering 
these areas.24  
 
                                                   
23 Interviews with local observers, journalists, and politicians from Mosul. 
Mosul, June 2019- February 2020.  
24 Sam Dagher, Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis, The New 
York Times, (May 17, 2009). 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/world/middleeast/18nineveh.html?fbcl
id=IwAR1fhrh610hgHf8mlNiOYla22OmbUjmFXfcgtxenIeX9DnBXEIYi0b_gZsM 
25 Ahmed Ali, ‘Iraq’s Provincial Elections and Their National Implications’, 
Institute for the Study of War, (March 19, 2013), 
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraq%E2%80%99s-provincial-
elections-and-their- national-implications  
2011 - 2014: Disintegration and consolidation of 
the political field 
External patronage – whether it be from 
Baghdad or international actors -- is a 
powerful but often unreliable source of 
political finance and support. Soon after the 
US and the Prime Minister Maliki had 
supported the emergence of Hadbaa in 
Nineveh, the US abruptly withdrew from Iraq, 
which significantly contributed to the growing 
strength of Maliki at the national level. The 
emboldened Maliki used the coercive power 
of the ISF to impose himself upon Nineveh for 
his own political interests, placing Nujaifi in a 
vulnerable position. This external threat from 
Baghdad accelerated market dynamics 
locally, as Nujaifi subsequently pivoted 
towards an alliance with the KDP and reached 
a deal allowing the Kurds back into the local 
government,25 a deal which partly revolved 
around an understanding to allow the KRG to 
exploit Nineveh’s oil fields.26 Nujaifi’s 
defensive about-face and transactional 
alliance with the Kurds simultaneously eroded 
the already fragile internal coherence of his 
own bloc, as key elements from Hadbaa broke 
away in opposition to the rapprochement.27 
As a result of this fragmentation, the Hadbaa 
coalition fared poorly during the 2013 local 
elections. Meanwhile Maliki attempted to 
capitalise on Hadbaa’s internal divisions by 
extending political and financial support to 
disaffected Sunni Arab tribal figures and 
politicians. This strategy of co-optation made 
little headway, however. The ISF’s harsh 
treatment of the city’s Sunni Arab population, 
which was locally perceived as a direct 
26 Interviews with local observers, journalists, and politicians from Mosul. 
Mosul, June 2019- February.  
27 When Atheel allied with the Kurds in 2012, he angered and alienated 
many of his allies within Hadbaa including the heads of tribal blocks who 
hold positions within the local government (Abdullah al-Yawar, from the 
Shammar Tribes and Dildar Zebari, from the Zebari Kurdish tribe) and 
other local figures such as Nineveh’s former Governor al-Baso. Maliki 
approached these groups and personalities and eventually co-opted some 
of them. See: Ali, Op.Cit.  
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extension of Maliki’s policies, made it politically 
toxic for locals to enter into alliances with the 
Prime Minister.28  
 
The intensifying political turmoil led to confusion 
across the local government and security 
branches, effectively lowering the barriers to 
entry into the political arena. Specifically, the 
erosion of Nujaifi’s hold across Mosul’s various 
tribal factions paved the way for insurgent and 
radical groups like ISIS to establish themselves 
within Mosul city’s eastern neighbourhoods.29 
With fighters and weapons pouring into a 
province ridden by political and security 
disagreements, the ISF collapsed in the face of 
the ISIS’s June 2014 violent offensive on 
Nineveh, forcing both the Nujaifi administration 
and the Kurdish representatives to flee the 
province.30 ISIS re-established unified 
administrative and territorial control over 
Nineveh using violence, but at a huge cost for 
the local population. 
  
2015 - present: The rise of a turbulent political 
marketplace 
While the rise of ISIS temporarily placed the 
entirety of the province under the coercive 
control of a single political entity, the military 
campaign to dislodge the extremist group did 
just the opposite, shattering most of the previous 
parameters and barriers regulating entry into the 
political arena. The campaign to take back 
Nineveh from ISIS involved a loose coalition of 
external military actors backed by the Baghdad-
based Shia parties as well as their Sunni 
affiliates, providing unprecedented opportunity 
                                                   
28 Interviews with local observers, journalists, and politicians from Mosul. 
Mosul, June 2019- February. On the ISF’s mistreatment of the Sunni Arabs of 
Mosul, see: Aljazeera.net, ‘Curfew in Mosul and threats towards escalating the 
protests’, (March 8, 2013), https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/ رظح-لوجت-
لصوملاب-دیدھتو-دیعصتب-جاجتحلاا /2013/3/8  
29 Iraqi Government Report Investigating the fall of Mosul, P. 39. The report is 
available at: ةرملل-اىلولأ-اةقیثول-ةیمسرلا-ریرقتل-طوقس-
لصوملا/139592/http://almasalah.com/ar/News  
30 Knights, Op. Cit.  
31 Aljazeera.net, ‘Iraqi Parliament removes Nineveh’s governor Atheel Nujaifi  
from his position’, (May 28, 2015), ناملربلا-ايقارعل-یلیق-مظفاح-ىونین-لیثٔا-
يفیجنلا/2015/5/28/https://www .aljazeera.net/news/arabic  
for the coercive and easy capture of roads, 
local industries, and territories. In addition to 
the uptick in violent forms of capture, the 
loyalties of local political actors were easily 
rented/purchased for cash. After Baghdad 
removed Nujaifi from the governorship in 
2015,31 Nineveh’s loose Sunni Arab coalition 
collapsed entirely, and the fragmented 
remnants became targets for national Shia 
and Sunni parties’ divide and conquer 
strategy.32 Local government administrators 
and provincial council members looked to 
influential national parties for support and 
material gains (except for the KDP-aligned 
provincial council block, which has always 
remained intact).33 This allowed influential 
national figures such as Muhammed 
Halbousi, Khamis Khanjar, and national 
parties such as the Atta party, Badr, the AAH, 
and the KDP to capture key local government 
offices primarily through co-opting local 
officials and administrators.34 This political 
marketplace -- mediated by both violence and 
co-optation among an array of actors -- has 
resulted in political turmoil and government 
chaos in Nineveh. As soon as any governor 
fails to respond to party demands, he is 
removed from office.35 
 
Key levers/mechanisms of power 
Violence and Coercive Power 
Control over Nineveh has largely revolved 
around the usage of force, particularly in 
asserting domination over strategic swathes 
of territory and key institutions. Initially the 
32 Alhayat.com, Struggle inside Nineveh provincial council intensifies’, 
(June 06, 2017), ةكم/ةسایس-امادتحا/ةمركمل-اعارصل-لخاد-سلجم-ةظفاحم-
ىونین/873481/http://www.alhayat.com/article 
33 Interviews with several Nineveh provincial council members and civil 
society activists and journalists from Mosul. Mosul, July 20-September 20, 
2019. 
34 Based on interviews with local officials, journalists and political 
observers from Mosul. Mosul, July 20-September 20, 2019.  
35 Zmkan Ali Saleem, Prisoner of the Deal: Nineveh’s governor and local 
state capture, (March 2020). 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/03/12/prisoner-of-the-deal-ninevehs-
governor-and-local-state-capture/ 
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centrality of coercive power emerged from the 
expansionist aims of the Kurdish political parties 
and armed groups, who sought to capitalize 
upon their alliance with the US military during the 
2003 invasion in order to expand their sphere of 
influence outward from Erbil across the Nineveh 
Plains and into Mosul city. As the Kurdish 
security forces established hegemony over the 
administrative apparatus of the province 
concentrated in the eastern side of Mosul city, 
Sunni Arab armed groups and later AQI drew a 
line of demarcation at the Tigris River, asserting 
territorial control over the areas to the west of 
the river. Years later during the anti-ISIS 
campaign, Coalition Forces contributed to the 
solidification of similar dynamics albeit with 
different actors involved.36 While ISF engaged in 
a street-by-street fighting against ISIS,37 Iraqi and 
Coalition air forces heavily bombed and 
destroyed positions taken by members of the 
Sunni militant group in the heart of the western 
side of the city,38 killing scores of civilians. The 
near total destruction of west Mosul city due to 
the Coalition bombing campaign left it open for 
domination by the PMF, which took up positions 
in the city following the cessation of liberation 
operations.39 To this day, the PMF and their 
proxies remain in control of key roadways and 
districts not only in Mosul city but also across 
the province, and they show no signs of leaving 
despite repeated requests from the Prime 
Minister’s Office. The centrality of violence is in 
part related to the perception among the Shia 
political parties and affiliated militias that the 
Mosul population is, and will remain opposed to 
the post-2003 political order which saw their 
                                                   




VmieRa7iASoY, and Jessa Rose Dury -Agri, Omer Kassim, and Patrick Martin, 
Iraq Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, ISW, 
(2017).http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-
%20ISF%20PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf?fbclid=IwAR014JoZco2n
HkZ6iJWMHlWTLo0s1jOkhPiiRV-Huk3h4xuJ1kxaxiCf-qQ   
37 BBC, Mosul assault: Iraq troops make headway against IS, (February 9, 
2017). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39018984 
38 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Civilian Casualties Mount in West Mosul - 
Coalition, Iraqi Forces Taking Inadequate Precautions, (June 6, 2017). 
economic and political fortunes diminish. 
 
Transactional alliances 
This expansive demonstration of coercive 
capacity across the province’s territory in the 
post-ISIS period has left local Sunni Arab 
political actors, who were already severely 
weakened and fragmented following the 
dissolution of the grand Sunni Arab Hadbaa 
Coalition, with a binary choice: either they can 
accept whatever material gains may come 
from an alliance with the powerful political 
parties with forces on the ground (e.g., Shia 
parties/PMF and their Sunni Arab affiliates as 
well as the Kurdish political parties), or they 
can exit the political sphere altogether empty-
handed. The vast majority have chosen the 
former.40 In the post-ISIS period, external 
parties have been able to buy-off the loyalties 
of Nineveh’s government officials and 
administrators including governors, provincial 
council members, and heads of government 
directorates.41 This co-optation strategy has 
granted national parties access to local 
reconstruction contracts, smuggling routes, 
and new electoral blocs.42 This mode of naked 
transactional deal-making between external 
and local actors sets Nineveh apart from 
Diyala and Basra. Whereas the Baghdad-
based Shia parties can rely heavily on co-
religionists and party members in order to 
capture local institutions in Diyala and Basra, 
in Nineveh natural allies on the ground are in 
short supply. Thus, local allies are forged 
through the threat of violence on the one hand 
and access to resources on the other. 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/06/iraq-civilian-casualties-mount-
west-mosul 
39 Julie Ahn, Maeve Campbell, Peter Knoetgen, The Politics of Security in 
Nineveh: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, Harvard 
Kennedy School/ Policy Analysis Exercise, (May 7, 2018). 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/degree%20programs/MP
P/files/Finalized%20PAE_Ahn_Campbell_Knoetgen.pdf 
40 Interviews with local observers, journalists, and politicians from Mosul. 
Mosul, June 2019- February. 
41 Interviews with former and current officials in the governor’s and 
members of the provincial council. Mosul (July 20- September 20, 2019)  
42 Interviews with local analysts, journalists, and former government 
officials in Nineveh. Mosul (January-February 2010) 
12          Iraq’s Political Marketplace at the Subnational Level 
  
Illicit economic activity 
Control over roadways and checkpoints during 
the chaos of liberation operations granted the 
Popular Mobilization Forces and their allies 
access to illicit forms of economic activity, such 
as the smuggling of oil and scrap metal as well 
as the illegal extraction of rents.43 Similarly, co-
opted government officials in the governor's 
office as well as the line directorates ensure that 
companies affiliated with powerful political 
interests receive access to reconstruction 
contracts.44 Groups within the PMF have opened 
economic offices in Nineveh, capitalizing on ties 
with local officials to access sources of 
business. The scrap metal trade, for instance, is 
largely monopolized by affiliates of two Shia 
militia parties through their connections with 
Nineveh’s former governor Nofal Agub.45 The 
PMF is involved in oil smuggling from Nineveh to 
the rest of Iraq and to the KRG.46  
  
Party discipline and patronage 
Within this highly transactional political arena, 
only one local set of political actors has 
remained coherent and intact, impervious to all 
forms of co-optation from external parties. The 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), whose 
stronghold is situated in Erbil, 80 kilometres east 
of Mosul city, is simultaneously a wealthy 
external party and an indigenous local party.47 
Throughout the various stages of Nineveh’s 
political evolution, KDP members operating in 
the province have fallen in line with the party. 
This coherence has allowed the KDP to remain 
influential over Nineveh’s politics at nearly every 
turn. Politically, the KDP has played the role of 
                                                   
43 The final report of the fact finding committee-Iraqi parliament, (January 
2019), https://www.alsumaria.tv/news/263485/ ةیرموسلا-زوین-رشنت-ریرقت-ةنجل-يصقت-
قئاقحلا-نأشب-ين /ar  
44 Interviews with several local politicians, civil society activists, and journalists 
from Mosul. Mosul, July 20- September 20, 2019.  
45 John Davison, Exclusive: Iran-backed groups corner Iraq’s postwar scrap 




46 Asharq al-Awsat, After US Sanctions, Iraq Freezes Assets of PMF Leaders, 
(July 27, 2019). https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1831601/after-us-
the “kingmaker” in the formation of local 
governments in Nineveh and it has been able 
to secure key positions within the local 
government including the first deputy 
governorship.48 This role is largely due to the 
party’s ability to maintain internal 
cohesiveness at a time when other parties 
and blocks suffer from fragmentation and 
defection.  
 
What explains this cohesiveness? Patronage 
within the Kurdistan Region is a nearly 
totalizing system. Two dominant and stable 
political parties have monopolized the political 
space for decades through the usage of 
patronage networks, threats of violence, and 
state capture. The region is co-ruled by a two-
party duopoly under two powerful families – 
with the Barzanis controlling Erbil and Dohuk 
under the banner of the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP), and the Talabanis controlling 
Sulaimani while also exerting outsized 
influence over Kirkuk under the banner of the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). It is almost 
impossible to obtain a junior or senior post in 
the government outside the party apparatus 
and hierarchy. While Nineveh falls outside of 
the KDP or PUK’s totalizing jurisdiction, the 
same basic rules apply to its members. For 
Kurds operating in Nineveh’s political arena, 
the costs of breaking from the party would be 
immense.49 In sum, a dominant position in 
one sub-regional political market can spill 




47 Zmkan Ali Saleem, & J. Mac Skelton, Mosul And Basra After The 
Protests: The Roots Of Government Failure & Popular Discontent, IRIS 
Working Paper. (2019). 
https://auis.edu.krd/iris/sites/default/files/Saleem%2C%20Skelton%20-
%20Oct%202019.pdf 
48 Interview with Nineveh’s current first deputy governor, an affiliate of the 
KDP. Mosul, August 21, 2019. 
49 Zmkan Ali Saleem, & J. Mac Skelton, The Parties Come First: Patronage, 
Security, and Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan, LSE/Middle East Centre, Report, 
Forthcoming May 2020.  
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How did the events following the Kurdish 
referendum of 2017 impact the KDP’s role and 
influence in Nineveh? In short, the KDP has 
remained broadly influential over Nineveh’s 
politics, security, and economy. The KDP security 
forces’ withdrawal have not included all districts, 
as they remain in control of parts of the Nineveh 
Plains where there are oil fields operated by 
party affiliated companies.50 In areas of total 
peshmerga withdrawal such as Sinjar, the KDP 
left behind proxy local forces. Further, the KDP 
maintained vast patronage networks within parts 
of the society and administrative apparatuses of 
Nineveh. The reduction in the party’s sources of 
political finance after the events of October 2017 
has not decimated existing patronage networks 
in Nineveh given the party’s access to multiple 
sources of funds including the oil sector, the 
border crossings (with Turkey, Iran, and Syria) 
and revenues from the KDP’s large investment 
and construction companies.51 However, they 
are no longer the sole major source of patronage 
due to the introduction of numerous National 
level blocs and militias into the provincial 
political arena in the wake of the anti-ISIS 
campaign. They have retained the capacity to 
engage in co-optation, but they do so within a far 
more competitive field.  
 
III. Case Study: Basra Province 
Basra is Iraq’s most resource-rich governorate. 
The province accounts for approximately 80% of 
Iraq’s total oil production and contains the 
country’s largest gas fields. In contemporary 
Iraq, where oil accounts for the overwhelming 
majority of state revenue, Basra, with its 
concentration of revenue potential has become a 
critical sub-national arena where all of the major 
Shia political parties (and their affiliated armed 
groups) protect significant assets and vie for 
control over contracts. Despite the enormous 
                                                   
50 Ahn et al, Op.Cit., pp.37-40. 
51 Interviews with local observers, journalists, and politicians from Mosul. Mosul, June 2019- February. 
wealth of the province, nearly all funds and 
contracts are channelled through the party-
dominated systems of patronage, leaving few 
resources for the work of governance and 
service provision. As a result, Basra’s 
population has suffered from a lack of 
electricity, water contamination, and 
unemployment, and consequently massive 
anti-party protests have broken out in 2011, 
2015, and again in 2018.  For reasons detailed 
below, however, the ruling parties have 
retained a firm grip on power.  
 
Political/Security actors  
Basra’s main political actors are 
simultaneously the country’s primary Shia 
parties and armed groups, with the one 
exception of the Basra-based Fadhilla party 
(see below). Since 2003, the major Shia 
parties have viewed Basra as an essential 
source of national power due to the large Shia 
population and high concentration of natural 
resources.  
  
● Hikma current: Formerly the Islamic 
Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI), Hikma 
enjoys large influence over Basra’s politics 
and economy. Hikma was able to forge an 
alliance with the Sadirist current and 
Fadhilla party to gain control of Basra from 
the State of Law in 2014.  
● Sadirist Current: The Sadirist Current lacks 
a strong popular base in Basra. Yet 
through armed militias (2003-2008) and 
tactical alliances with other parties, 
Sadirist have been able to entrench 
themselves within Basra’s local 
government and economy.  
● Badr Organization & Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH): 
Badr split from ISCI (see Hikma above) and 
formed its own powerful entity. Badr’s 
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standing in Basra was elevated through the 
anti-ISIS campaign. Allied with AAH, it has 
been involved in cracking down on the local 
protest movement. 
● Fadhilla party: A Shia party with particular 
focus on Basra, imposing dominance over 
Basra’s oil sector and local government 
(2003-2007). Fadhilla has lost much of its 
influence in Basra over recent years.  
● Nouri Maliki’s Dawa (State of Law) Party: 
Maliki’s control over Iraq’s national wealth 
and security forces allowed him to bolster the 
State of Law’s standing in Basra over the 
course of his premiership.  
 
Key shifts in the Political Marketplace 
2003 - 2007: Competitive and collusive violence 
Due to the vacuum created by the fall of the 
Ba’ath regime and the total disarray of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in Basra, the 
barriers to entry into the province’s emerging 
political field was low and correspondingly the 
number of actors vying for control were high. 
The major Shia parties grabbed up economic 
assets and state institutions in Basra in the early 
weeks and months after the invasion,52 but 
according to different tactics and strategies 
related to local capacity. As a longstanding 
national opposition party with high numbers of 
experienced political actors and well-trained 
militias (the Badr Brigades),53 the ISCI was able 
to leverage its growing influence over key 
ministries in Baghdad in order to control 
appointments across the local security 
directorates in Basra.54 The Sadirist movement -- 
                                                   
52 Babak Rahimi, ‘The Militia Politics of Basra’, The Jamestown Foundation, 
Terrorism Monitor, Vol.5, No.13, (July 6, 2007), 
https://jamestown.org/program/the-militia-politics-of-basra/,  
53 International Crisis Group, Shia Politics in Iraq: The Role of The Supreme 
Council, Middle East Report No 70, (November 15, 
2007a).https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/70-shiite-politics-in-iraq-the-
role-of-the-supreme-council.pdf  
54 International Crisis Group, Where Is Iraq Heading?: Lessons From Basra, 
Middle East Report No.67, (June 25, 
2007b).https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/67-where-is-iraq-heading-
lessons-from-basra.pdf   
55 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, ‘Oiling the wheels of war: smuggling becomes the real 
which lacked a significant popular base in 
Basra -- relied upon the coercive force of their 
militias to take over key oil smuggling 
distribution channels.55 Across the national 
and local parties competing in Basra, state 
capture relied heavily on violence and 
intimidation.56 For example militias affiliated 
with the Basra-based Fadhilla party gained 
control of oil institutions, eventually imposing 
a party affiliate as the head of the state-
owned Southern Oil Company (later renamed 
Basra Oil Company).57 
 
While the various militia parties competed 
over the capture of assets and institutions, 
they simultaneously engaged in collusive 
violence against secular political actors that 
could pose an alternative to the post-2003 
dominance of Shia Islamist parties.58 This 
campaign of violence and intimidation in 
Basra was aimed at undercutting the broader 
US-led Coalition’s designs to prop up secular 
figures across the country and prevent the 
control of the Shia Islamists.59 (The US 
contributed to the foiling of their own plans 
through de-Baathification, which side-lined 
thousands of secularists.) A pattern was 
established that would repeat itself later: the 
Shia parties competed violently against each 
other over Basra’s wealth but often engaged 
in collusive violence against external threats.  
 
The violence between the Shia parties 
increased in direct relation to intensifying 
competition in formal politics, where the blocs 
utilized competing ethno-nationalist and 
economy of Iraq’, The Guardian, (June 9, 2007), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/09/iraq-middleeast 
56 International Crisis Group, ‘Where is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra’, 
Middle East Report, (June 25, 2007), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-
east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/where-iraq-heading-
lessons- basra  
57  Rahimi, Op.Cit, 
58 International Crisis Group, 2007b, Op.Cit, pp. 3-4.  
59 International Crisis Group, Iraq: Can Local Governance Save Central 
Government?, (October 27, 2004), pp. 15-18. 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/33-iraq-can-local-governance-
save-central-government.pdf  
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nationalist discourses to mobilize subsections of 
the population against each other. An alliance of 
Shia Islamist factions led by ISCI won the 2005 
elections by a majority, but the Fadhilla party 
took control over the local government by 
forming the largest post-election coalition, which 
included the Baghdad-based Iraqi National 
Accord party and other smaller local factions.60 
Seeking to check Fadhilla’s rise, ISCI sought to 
use its networks in Baghdad and across the 
national political apparatus to create a 9 
province southern semi-autonomous region with 
Basra as its economic and political hub.61 With 
ISCI possessing the most sophisticated 
organizational and electoral capacity across the 
south, competitors feared that the party would 
dominate the semi-autonomous region62 in the 
same way the KDP dominates the bulk of the 
Kurdish region, thereby raising the barriers of 
entry into the political space for everyone else. 
The Fadhilla party was existentially threatened 
by this agenda, and responded by advocating for 
a smaller region including provinces in which 
their electoral support was highest (Basra, 
Thiqar, and Maysan). Meanwhile the Sadirists 
rejected all forms of federalism due to their low 
electoral base in Basra, and they raised the 
banner of Iraqi nationalism to shore up support 
for their position.63  
 
As political tensions grew, so did violence 
between the parties. In addition to their own 
forces, the major parties created alliances with 
local Basra-based militias in order to fight each 
other. Many of these smaller militias were 
already receiving funds and logistical support 
from Iran. (It is important to note that Iran was 
not a major source of political finance for the 
                                                   
60 International Crisis Group, 2007b, Op.Cit, pp. 5-6.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid, p.6 
64 Ibid, pp.7-8.  
65 Rahimi, Op.Cit, ,The Economist, ‘Searching for a Phoenix in Basra’, (April 30, 
2009), https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and- 
africa/2009/04/30/searching-for-a-phoenix-in-basra, Babak Rahimi, Op.Cit, and 
parties at this time. The Islamic Republic’s 
primary agenda was to play a spoiler role 
against the Americans and British by 
supporting militia groups that would carry out 
targeted attacks.)64 In addition to fighting 
between the Shia parties, the Sadirists were 
overtly fighting Coalition forces. Facing a 
security crisis and the potential for high 
casualties, British troops essentially 
outsourced the counter-insurgency and relied 
heavily on militias under the control of  ISCI 
and Fadhilla to combat the Sadirists and 
stabilize the situation.65 Whatever short-term 
gains were won through this approach were 
offset by the rising wealth and power of the 
local parties and their armed affiliates. 
Meanwhile violence between the ISCI, 
Fadhilla, and the Sadirists continued 
unabated. Violence was the primary currency 
used to resolve political competition.  
 
2008 - 2013: Consolidation of the political field 
through violence and patronage 
While the access of the local parties and 
security forces to cash and weapons was 
significant, they nonetheless paled in 
comparison to the growing financial strength 
and technological sophistication of the Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF), who were backed by the 
US Military and global coalition partners. In 
2008, then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent 
the ISF to Basra in order to quell the security 
crisis and assert the power of the central 
government. This offensive, known as 
Operation Charge of the Knights, temporarily 
cooled the intensity of the competition 
between militias in Basra (particularly 
weakening the Mahdi Army of the Sadirists).66 
But ultimately, as was observed previously in 
Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, ‘Basra after the British: division and despair in Iraq’s oil 
boomtown’, The Guardian, (July 4, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jul/04/basra-british-iraq-oil-
boomtown-legacy-chilcot-saddam 
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the case in Nineveh, Maliki’s designs were not 
solely oriented towards state interests. 
Capitalizing on the coercive capacity of the 
Coalition-backed ISF, Maliki moved to secure his 
national profile and expand his bloc’s (State of 
Law) popular base in Basra.67 Drawing upon 
immense state wealth and authority, Maliki 
provided jobs in the public sector to Basra 
residents, co-opted the governorate’s key tribes, 
and allocated significant funds for 
reconstruction.68 Maliki’s capacity to extend 
benefits to Basra’s population was not 
significantly hampered by the global financial 
crisis beginning in 2008, as the sources of 
political finance in Iraq remained diverse and 
domestic oil production was only just beginning 
to increase dramatically during this period. It is 
important to note that while the Prime Minister 
was systematically engineering a patronage 
network, it was a network that included benefits 
towards the existing political parties. Maliki did 
not have enough popular appeal locally to shut 
out ISCI, Fadhilla, and the Sadirists entirely. 
Affiliates of these parties were awarded 
positions across the local government. 
Nonetheless, the local balance of power was 
now tilted heavily in favour of Maliki’s State of 
Law alliance (consisting of the State of Law and 
Badr Organization), which won the 2009 local 
elections by a landslide.69  Basra’s political field 
remained oligopolistic with a handful of powerful 
groups competing for power, but one actor 
stood above the rest.   
 
2014 - present: Levelling of the Political Field 
The increased activity of International Oil 
Companies (IOCs) and sub-contractors in 
Basra’s oil fields during the 2010-2014 period 
                                                   
67 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Basra, Southern Iraq and the Gulf: Challenges and 
Connections’, Research Paper, Kuwait Programme on Development, Number 
21, (February 2012), pp. 14-15.  
68 Saleem al-Wazzan, ‘Al-Maliki Emerges Triumphant in Basra’, Niqash, 
(February 4, 2009), http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/2380/ 
69 Musings On Iraq, Official Election Results, (February 19, 2019). 
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2009/02/official-iraqi-election-
results.html 
70 Matthew Schweitzer, ‘Basra’s Neglected Future’, Enabling Peace in Iraq 
intensified the political struggle for controlling 
the governorate. With revenues on the rise, 
each of the major political parties saw 
securing access to oil-related revenue and 
contracts as an existential imperative.70 
Accordingly, Shia parties (the ISCI, Sadirist), 
who had violently battled against each other 
just a few years earlier, now came together in 
an electoral coalition to oppose Maliki. 
Despite the fact that Maliki’s State of Law 
allied with the Badr Organization won the 
largest votes during the 2013 elections, the 
rest of the parties (the ISCI, Sadirist, and 
Fadhilla) formed a power-sharing 
arrangement in order to secure top executive 
positions in the local government in the hands 
of ISCI (later changed name to Hikma) and 
the Sadirists.71 At this point, the political 
marketplace was relatively stable, consisted 
of a few large actors (or coalitions) and the 
political and economic share of each major 
entity was on par with the others (in what was 
a plainly oligopolistic structure).  
 
This equilibrium would soon be disrupted by 
the rise of the Islamic State and specifically 
the mobilization of a large subsection of the 
province’s population as fighters within the 
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). As these 
forces cycled between the battlefront in the 
home front, they introduced a new dynamic 
within the local political economy, as returning 
fighters saw themselves as entitled to local 
rents and shares in businesses. One 
prominent local businessman in the oil sector 
noted: “The PMF came to my office and 
basically demanded a contract for their 
affiliates, saying, ‘look we sacrificed a lot 
Center (EPIC), (September 27, 2017), https://epic-usa.org/basra-future/, 
International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes’, Middle 
East Report No.82, (January 2009), pp.7- 8, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-
peninsula/iraq/iraq-s-provincial-elections- stakes 
71 Alsumaria.tv, Election of Hakim’s candidate as Basra’s governor, (June 
12, 2013). https://www.alsumaria.tv/news/77642/ باختنا-حشرم-ةلتك-میكحلا-دجام-
ياورصنلا-حم /ar 
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against ISIS, and you owe us.’72 Accordingly, the 
political affiliates of the PMF such as the Badr 
Organization and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq saw their 
fortunes rise considerably in Basra, laying claim 
to ports, border crossings , and the oil sector. 
Badr and AAH ultimately used their access to 
resources in the province to buy off the loyalties 
of powerful officials.73   
 
Were it not for the protest movement of 2018, 
the political blocs affiliated with the PMF might 
have been able to consolidate power further and 
displace other actors to the peripheries of the 
political marketplace. But the mass 
demonstrations against the political parties 
encouraged renewed collusion between all the 
major political blocs, as they cracked down on 
the demonstrations while also protecting the 
assets of each. Ultimately the immense wealth in 
Basra is too great for any single political actor to 
risk the dismantlement of the political system, 
solidifying the oligopolistic structure. To date, no 
party is dominant, and the struggle over top 
posts remains highly unpredictable.74 
 
Key levers/mechanisms of power 
Layered Administrative Capture 
Control over the governorship and top levels of 
the local government has shifted from the 
Fadhilla party (2003-2005), to the ISCI (2005-
2009), to the State of Law alliance (2009-2013), 
and finally to the Hikma/ Sadirist/ Fadhilla 
alliance. During the periods of successive 
control, parties and coalitions filled key positions 
(such as the deputy governors, advisors, and 
heads and members of contracting and legal 
departments) in the local government with their 
own followers, enabling them to bargain for 
shares in government contracts.75 Importantly, 
                                                   
72 Interview with a local businessman from Basra. Basra, May 2019. 
73 Interviews with local officials, journalists, and members of Basra’s protest 
movement. Basra (April 31-May 3, 2019) 
74 Interviews with local officials, journalists, and members of Basra’s protest 
movement. Basra (April 31-May 3, 2019) 
the turnover of positions has never been 
wholesale from the dominance of one party or 
coalition to the next. The current governor is 
backed by Badr and Asa’ib ahl al-Haq, but 
meanwhile a Sadirist and a member of the 
State of Law occupy the positions of the 
current governor’s two deputies respectively, 
while followers of Hikma, Fadhilla, and the 
state of law are present at the 
contracting/legal department and across 
technical and engineering committees.76 In 
other words, the fluidity of the governorship 
according to electoral shifts is balanced out 
by the durability of senior and mid-level posts. 
This layering of party-based state captured 
from one administration to the next has 
resulted in relatively even distribution of mid 
to senior level officials across the political 
parties regardless of which bloc holds the 
governor’s post.  
 
Capture of State Economic Assets 
The same logic holds true in the capture of 
the state positions and assets related to the 
oil and gas industry. Appointing the head of 
the Basra Oil Company (BOC) is a decision 
controlled by Iraq’s Ministry of Oil. The 
position has been renegotiated and shifted 
from one party to another in successive 
periods.  Since 2003, the top post in the BOC 
has changed hands from Fadhilla (2003-2008) 
to the State of Law (2009-2016) and finally to 
Hikma (2017-present). Key posts and 
positions within the ministry itself are 
allocated to various parties. Thus, one party 
receives the position of the minister while the 
rest are compensated by assigning lower 
positions to their members and followers, 
including membership in the ministry’s 
advisory board, general directorship, and 
75 Interviews with current and former provincial council members, 
journalists, and observers from Basra. Basra (April 31-May 3, 2019). 
76 Interviews with current and former officials and administrators in 
Basra’s local government. Basra (April 31-May 3, 2019). 
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heads of the ministry’s oil companies.77 The 
parties’ capture of formal organs of the state 
grants them control over  lucrative revenue-
producing assets across the province. The 
Hikma current, for instance, has maintained 
control of northern Rumaylah oil fields, the 
Safwan border crossing with Kuwait, and the 
port of al-Maqal in Shatt al-Arab. Maliki’s State of 
Law controls (60%) of the port of Umm Qasr, 
subcontracted services at the southern 
Rumaylah oil fields and the Barjisia oil fields, 
Basra airport, and a petrochemical factory in 
addition to influence over gas fields in Barjisia.78  
 
Competitive and Collusive Violence 
The political parties in Basra have employed 
both competitive and collusive violence in order 
to secure control over assets and the population. 
In the years following the invasion, a violent 
struggle for power and control between Fadhilla, 
ISCI, and the Sadirists overshadowed Basra. Not 
only did they employ violence to check each 
other’s ambitions, they also collusively used 
violence to intimidate and eliminate potential 
non-Shia and non-Islamist rivals in Basra. With 
the deployment of the Iraqi Security Forces in 
2008, high intensity violence among the political 
parties and their affiliated armed actors largely 
came to a halt.79 In its place came another 
iteration of collusive violence -- this time against 
an increasingly restive population. The protest 
movement in Basra has posed an existential 
threat to the entire party-controlled system. In 
the summer of 2018, protestors burned down 
local government and party buildings, staging 
demonstrations around Basra’s oil fields, the 
lifeline of the Iraqi economy. Recognizing their 
collective vulnerability, the parties colluded with 
                                                   
77 Interview with a political activist from Basra who is also a senior officer at 
Basra Oil Company. Basra (March 2019).   
78  Several interviews with members of various Shia parties, administrative 
figures, provincial council members, and activists in Basra (March and April 
2019). For further discussion of party-controlled assets, see: Center for 
International and Strategic Policymaking, ‘Basra Turbulences: the protests in 
the south and its local and regional consequences’, (July 18, 2018). 
https://www.makingpolicies.org/ar/posts/basraaa.php 
one another to contain the demonstrations 
through force.80 Basra’s parties used influence 
in Baghdad to relocate parts of the state’s 
forces to Basra to back up the existing local 
and federal police in the governorate. Party 
militias and state forces fired live ammunition 
at the protestors, killing and wounding tens of 
demonstrators. Intelligence and security 
forces co-opted by the parties targeted and 
threatened key leaders of the protest 
movement in an effort to deter and prevent 
further protests in future.81 During the October 
2019 protests, which overtook the entirety of 
the south, Basra’s once forceful movement 
was relatively quiet. The political parties had 
asserted themselves once and they would do 
it again if necessary.  
 
IV. Case Study: Diyala Province 
Diyala province, which shares a long border 
with Iran, is unique among Iraqi federal 
governorates in that a single party – the Iran-
backed Badr Organization – now enjoys 
almost total hegemonic control over the 
entirety of the provincial administration, 
security apparatus, and strategic assets. 
Diyala has become a quasi-monopoly in 
which one entity (Badr) controls the barriers 
of entry into the political arena, and other 
political actors may enter this arena for 
commercial or political ends only  through 
deals and transactions with that single entity. 
This was not always so. While the struggle for 
power over the province has involved 
numerous political parties and militias since 
2003, the centre of control has gradually 
shifted towards the Badr-controlled provincial 
administration and affiliated armed groups. 
79 Cocharane, Op.Cit.  
80 J. Mac Skelton & Zmkan Ali Saleem, The Politics of Unemployment in 




81 Interviews with key leaders of Basra’s protest movement. Basra (March 
13 -May 3, 2019) 
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The case tracks the mechanisms that have led 
to this consolidation of power and the side-lining 
of the contesting groups.  
 
Political/Security actors  
● Badr Organization (formerly part of the 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq): Pro-Iran 
and Shia-majority political party and militia 
run by Hadi Ameri, who currently leads the 
Binaa Coalition.  
● Iranian government and security branches: 
The Iranian regime sees Diyala as part of its 
sphere of influence and has therefore ensured 
that the governorate remains under the tight 
control of its Iraqi allies (Badr and the AAH).  
● Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH): AAH is a Shia party 
and militia that is both partner and rival to 
Badr on the national stage and in Diyala.  
● Iraqi Security Forces (ISF): Badr and its 
members have a long history in dominating 
and co-opting the Iraqi government forces 
operating in Diyala. Top commanders of the 
local and federal police and the national 
security forces are Badr members and 
loyalists while the Iraqi army’s top 
commandership have been co-opted by Badr.  
● Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and security 
forces: The PUK controls the eastern half of 
the KRG and vies for influence over northern 
Diyala. Under Iranian pressure, however, the 
PUK will not overreach in Diyala.  
● Khamis al-Khanjar’s Mashroo’ al-arabi Party: 
The pro-Iran Sunni Arab party colludes with 
Badr nationally and in Diyala.  
● Sadirist Current: The characteristically volatile 
Shia party and militia has contested for power 
in Diyala for years.  
● Iraq Islamic Party (IIP): Sunni Arab party that 
briefly held influence in concert with the 
Sadirists in Diyala. 
● Sons of Iraq (sahwa) Forces (American 
                                                   
82 Donal P. Wright & Timothy R. Rose, On Point II: Transition to the New 
Campaign, Combat Studies Institute, (2008), p.413. 
proxies): Sunni Arab citizens, members of 
the Sunni Arab tribes, and former 
insurgents decided to side with the US 
forces against the AQI (2007-2009) in 
Diyala. Politically, most of the Sahwas in 
Diyala supported the IIP during the 2009 
local elections and subsequently became 
targets of persecution by Maliki and the 
Badr Organization.  
● ISIS: ISIS’s offensive in Diyala was repelled 
by the ISF and its allies among the PMF 
and the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the 
governorate was declared free from ISIS in 
January 2015.  
● Al-Qaeda in Iraq: The AQI exploited the 
rising ethno-sectarian tensions in Diyala in 
the early period after the 2003 invasion, 
eventually asserting control over strategic 
areas. Controlling Diyala provided the AQI 
with a base for launching attacks on 
northern Baghdad.  
 
Key shifts in the Political Marketplace  
2003 - 2006: Emergence of a two-sided violent 
struggle 
The US military toppled Saddam Hussein’s 
forces in Diyala, but they failed to contend 
with the quick consolidation of armed groups 
comprised in part of supporters of the former 
regime, which coalesced largely in opposition 
to the American mishandling of local 
government formation.82 (These armed 
groups were soon referred to as ‘Sunni Arab 
insurgents’, but their sectarian identity was 
not initially the key driver of mobilization.) 
Meanwhile, the Shia Islamist parties who now 
dominated the federal government following 
the 2003 invasion – particularly the Islamic 
Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) and its armed 
wing the Badr Brigades – were systematically 
capturing security ministries in Baghdad.83 
https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/GWOT/OnPointII.pdf 
83 United States Peace Institute (USIP), Iraq’s Interior Ministry: Frustrating 
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The Iran-backed ISCI leveraged this authority to 
place supporters in Diyala’s police and army 
units in order to secure the province’s long 
border with Iran and important pilgrimage/trade 
routes. A violent power struggle soon ensued: 
The non-state Sunni Arab armed groups (which 
eventually allied with Al-Qaeda) asserted 
dominance through violence against the Shia 
population, while the ISCI-backed state police 
and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) executed equally 
violent, coercive measures against the Sunni 
Arab population.84 Diyala’s strategic proximity to 
Iran combined with its split demographics85 -- 
with 60% Sunni Arabs and (Sunni) Turkomans 
and 25% Shia Arabs and (Shia) Turkomans and 
15% Kurdish populations86 -- incentivized the 
various political factions to draw the lines 
between supporters and opponents on the basis 
of sectarian identity. The population was drawn 
into this violent struggle for power.  
 
2007 - 2013: Consolidation of coercive capacity 
For a brief period AQI prevailed over the ISF and 
dominated the provincial capital, but US forces 
reasserted themselves as part of the ‘Surge,’ 
driving out the AQI through a series of large-
scale military operations in Diyala.87 This US-led 
campaign had the indirect effect of empowering 
the Iraqi Security Forces, who were firmly under 
the control of ISCI/Badr and the major Shia 
political blocs. These blocs, now led by Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki allied with ISCI/Badr, 
rebuffed American efforts to integrate Sunni 
Arab armed forces (the Sons of Iraq) who 
participated in the campaign against al Qaeda 
into the Iraqi Security Forces. In fact, Maliki used 
                                                   
Reform, USIP Briefing, (May 2008), 
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84 Kimberly Kagan, Securing Diyala, Institute for the Study of War, (2007). 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/Iraq%20Report%
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85 Michael Knights, Iraq's Bekaa Valley, Washington Institute, (March 16, 
2015).https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqs-bekaa-
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86 Michael Knights & Alex Mello, Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the 
Islamic State Could Exploit Iraq’s Sectarian Tinderbox, CTC Sentinel, (October 
2016), p2. https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2016/10/CTC-
SENTINEL_Vol9Iss109.pdf.  
87 Kimberly Kagan, The Battle for Diyala, Institute for the Study of War, (2007). 
the pretext of continuing campaigns against 
al Qaeda as a cover for violence against both 
the Sons of Iraq and the only viable Sunni 
Arab political party of the time, the Iraq 
Islamic Party (IIP).88 The consolidation of 
coercive capacity in the hands of the ISF 
rendered the IIP’s subsequent electoral 
successes largely irrelevant. When the IIP won 
the provincial elections of 2009, Maliki’s ISF 
allied with Badr relied upon violence to side-
line the IIP governor, eventually storming his 
headquarters and forcing him out of office in 
2011.89 The formal political process carried 
comparatively little weight in a province 
dominated by a politics of coercion. Any hope 
that Sunni Arabs would retain a measure of 
political agency and coercive power in Diyala 
was completely dashed with the pullout of 
American troops and 2011, a move that 
precipitated the collapse of ongoing 
negotiations between Bagdad and the Sunni 
Arab armed forces (Sons of Iraq) in the 
province.90 
 
2013 - 2014: Disintegration of political field 
Growing cracks and fissures between the Shia 
parties at the national level – driven in a large 
part by the struggle for control over rising 
state oil revenues – eventually lowered the 
barriers of entry into the political arena for 
Kurds and Sunni Arabs in Diyala. The first 
major development was that ISCI and Badr 
split into two separate political organizations, 
the Badr Organization and Amar Hakim’s 
Citizen Alliance. After a coalition of Shia 
aligned parties (Maliki’s State of Law, Badr, 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/IraqReport0
4.pdf 
88 Jared Young, Ahead of Iraq Vote, ISW Releases Diyala Province Political 
Report, Institute for the Study of War, (January 2009). 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/DiyalaProvincePress
Release.pdf 
89 Almadapaper, After Maliki’s deadline Diyala’s governor resigns, 
(February 27, 2012). 
https://almadapaper.net/view.php?cat=64827&fbclid=IwAR2dvuwM7gCN
-8xwutc91SQtRbk25hnmyclQRPYN29wHuyr1xRuPGOqjZRs 
90 Myriam Benraad, Iraq’s Tribal “Sahwa”: Its Rise and Fall, Middle East 
Policy, V. XVIII, No.1, (2011), pp.124-125. 
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Sadirists, Fadhilla, and Amar Hakim’s Citizen 
alliance) narrowly won the most seats in Diyala’s 
2013 provincial elections,91 the Sadirists shocked 
the other Shia parties by splintering off and 
forming a provincial government with the 
province’s Sunni and Kurdish parties.92 Maliki, 
Badr and the other Shia parties successfully 
challenged the move in the Supreme Court,93 but 
the Sadirist/Sunni alliance would not back down, 
resulting in two governors and two 
administrations. The two governments began 
issuing orders for dissolving each other and 
removing each other’s governors.94 To end the 
polarization, Maliki used his powers as the Prime 
Minister and removed the Sadirist/Sunni 
governor from his position based on an arrest 
warrant that accused the Sunni governor of 
wasting public money.95 Maliki and Badr now 
enjoyed the upper-hand in Diyala, but this 
episode proved that their grip on power was 
increasingly fragile.  
 
2014 - present: Reconsolidation of political order 
around one actor 
In the midst of this political instability, the rise of 
ISIS performed two functions that played to 
Badr’s favour. First, at the national level, it 
resulted in the removal of Nouri al-Maliki from 
power and the installation of a comparatively 
weak Prime Minister (Haider al-Abadi) ripe for 
manipulation. Second, at the level of the 
governorate, the encroachment of ISIS upon 
Diyala provided Badr and its aligned Popular 
Mobilization Forces a pretext to assert near-total 
                                                   
91 Ahmed Ali, Iraq’s Provincial Elections and The National Implications, ISW, 
(April 19, 2019). 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IraqsProvincialElections-
NationalImplications.pdf  
92 Alsumaria.tv, Sadr criticises Marja’ya’s stance on ditributing government 
positions and supports giving the position of Diyala’s governor to the Sunnis, 
(June 16, 2013).https://www.alsumaria.tv/mobile/news/77792/iraq-news. See 
also: Jessica Lewis, ‘The Islamic State Of Iraq Returns To Diyala’, ‘Institute for 
the Study of War’, (August 2014). http://www.understandingwar.org/islamic-
state-iraq-returns-diyala  
93 Burathanews.com, Administrative court delays for the seventh times 
National Alliance’s lawsuit regarding the legality of the local government, 
(September 2013). http://ftp.burathanews.com/arabic/news/212208 
94 Almadapaper.net, Re-electing Omer al-Humeiri as Diyala’s governor during a 
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security control over the province. Badr and 
the PMF allied with the ISF drove large 
numbers of Sunni Arabs from their towns and 
villages during the fight against ISIS.96 The 
previous Sunni coalition disintegrated and the 
remaining Sunni council members’ loyalties 
were bought off by Badr and the Iran-aligned 
Sunni Arab Khamis Khanjar through the 
extension of salaries and access to 
contracts.97 Today Badr controls nearly all 
aspects of the provincial administration and 
security, with only nominal power-sharing 
granted to the Kurdish security forces in the 
northern extremity of the province bordering 
the KRG.  
 
Key levers/mechanisms of power 
Violent forms of state capture 
Badr’s successful co-optation of the official 
security and administrative institutions in 
Diyala has been a crucial element of the 
party’s dominance over the governorate. Badr 
can engage in unrestrained violence against 
Diyala’s Sunni Arabs with impunity because 
local and federal police are co-opted by Badr 
and operate within the strategic framework of 
the militia party. Top commanders and the 
majority of members of the local and federal 
police in Diyala are tied into Badr’s patronage 
network for the long term -- meaning that they 
owe Badr for their government position 
and/or they owe Badr for access to 
government contracts, private sector deals, 
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22          Iraq’s Political Marketplace at the Subnational Level 
  
planned to remove the Badr-affiliated governor 
were pursued by police forces based on charges 
of supporting terrorism and intimidated by Badr’s 
private militias. In 2016 and 2017, Badr militias 
fired rockets at the provincial council’s building 
while police forces captured four council 
members on charges of supporting terrorism in 
order to prevent meetings that were arranged to 
remove the Badr-affiliated governor Muthana al-
Timimi.99 Governor Muthana has assigned key 
positions within the local government to Badr 
members and loyalists in Diyala. Almost 90% of 
mayors, head of sub-districts, and key 
directorates are now Badr loyalists.100 
 
Violence targeting the population 
Badr has used systemic collective violence to 
suppress and subjugate members of the Sunni 
Arab community. During and in the aftermath of 
the war with ISIS (2014-2016), the party and its 
affiliated militias forcefully drove out the Sunni 
Arab populations whom they had labelled ISIS 
supporters.101 In response to a January 2016 
suicide bombing in the city of Muqdadiya that 
killed party and militia members, Badr and its ally 
Asaib ahl al-Haq (AAH) locked down the city, 
killed 36 Sunni Arabs, and burned down tens of 
Sunni mosques, shops, and houses.102 Long 
after the defeat of ISIS, the continued presence 
of the military and intelligence bases of Badr-
controlled PMFs in the vicinity of Sunni cities, 
towns, and villages sends a strong psychological 
message to residents that the militia party is 
close and violence can be applied against them 
instantly.  
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Dominance over commercial networks  
The militia party’s control of the local 
government means that government funded 
projects are largely allocated to companies 
and persons aligned with Badr, including 
PMF/Badr commanders.103 Badr is involved in 
both formal and illicit cross-border trading 
with Iran and the KRG via checkpoints on the 
main roads. Influence over international 
border crossings located in Diyala guarantees 
Badr a cut of most cross-border trade and 
smuggling.104 Other Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish 
parties and figures in Diyala have essentially 
given up any meaningful struggle for control 
over Diyala’s political and security apparatus. 
Instead they have resigned themselves to 
working within the Badr-run economic and 
patronage system, seeking benefits in the 
form of government contracts, shares in local 
businesses, and employment in the public 
sector.105 Given the presence of large Kurdish 
and Sunni Arab populations, it remains in 
Badr’s best interest to provide key figures 
within these communities access (albeit 
limited) to local markets. Representatives of 
Khamis Khanjar’s Sunni Mashroo’ al-Arabi 
party, the Kurdish PUK, and the normally 
recalcitrant Sadirist current negotiate access 
to businesses, contracts, and employment 
opportunities with Badr’s governor in return 
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V. Discussion of the Cases 
The preceding cases have analysed the 
changing political dynamics and levers of power 
in three of Iraq’s most strategic and volatile 
political marketplaces - Nineveh, Basra, and 
Diyala. In each, the flow of political finance and 
usages of violence are distinct. After years of 
both struggle and collusion between Sunni Arab 
and Kurdish political actors, the political order in 
Nineveh is now characterized by highly volatile 
and fluid forms of co-optation among dozens of 
parties and militias. The one faction that has 
remained intact is the Kurdish bloc due to a 
longstanding system of patronage dating back 
decades, whereby loyalty to leadership is 
enforced through a systematic distribution of 
material rewards.  In Basra the political 
marketplace revolves around the struggle for oil-
based assets and institutions. The Shia parties 
and militias violently compete for assets while 
simultaneously engaging in collusive violence 
against any external threat to the political order, 
resulting in the systematic and targeted killings 
of protestors. Diyala is unique among Iraqi 
federal governorates in that a single party -- the 
Badr Organization -- enjoys almost total 
hegemonic control. All other participants within 
the political marketplace engage in commerce 
and politics on Badr’s terms. The militia party 
has achieved this status of dominance by 
mobilizing its massive military resources to take 
advantage of the chaos and disarray of the ISIS 
period (2014-2017), in addition to the gradual 
state capture of local security institutions 
between 2003 and the present.  
  
While the flows of political finance have shifted 
in relation to events particular to each province, 
certain key national-level events have rippled 
across the governorates with similar force. To 
name one key example, the anti-ISIS campaign – 
which coincided with a global dip in oil prices – 
resulted in major changes in each of the 
provinces. In Diyala, the anti-ISIS campaign 
shifted the local balance of power in favour of 
Badr and its allies in the PMF, as they played 
key roles in the defeat of ISIS and became the 
most powerful security actors on the ground. 
Government funds and private companies fell 
under the control of Badr, allowing the party to 
integrate the remaining local Sunni, Kurdish, 
and Shia politicians and figures within its 
patronage network. In Nineveh, the rise and 
fall of ISIS transformed an oligopolistic 
political field with two to three major actors 
(i.e., the KDP, Hadbaa, and central 
government) into a more open, fragmented, 
and competitive political marketplace with 
numerous parties and factions vying for 
territorial control, loyalties, economic gains 
and political influence. In short, the campaign 
shattered the barriers of entry into the political 
marketplace and allowed external parties to 
establish influence within the local 
government. In Basra, a multi-faction 
oligopolistic structure with high barriers of 
entry mostly held, although the parties and 
militias affiliated with the PMF gained 
relatively greater symbolic capital (by 
defending Iraq and the Shia community 
against the external threat of ISIS), using 
these gains to advance their position in 
relation to the other Shia parties.  
  
In all three provinces, the 2014 precipitous 
drop in oil prices transpiring at the same time 
as the anti-ISIS military campaign did not 
necessarily weaken the major players. Rather, 
it simply forced a redirection of revenue-
seeking activities, as the parties and militias 
sought to expand non-oil sources of finance 
such as smuggling activities (stolen oil, scrap 
metal, and narcotics) and extortion practices 
(via checkpoints and through direct illegal 
taxations of private businesses). Overall, 
militia parties expanded their sources of 
finances on the local level via smuggling and 
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extortion and thus maintained greater 
transactional abilities, while the central 
government became even weaker. This troubling 
dynamic is likely to transpire once again with the 
current drop in oil prices.  
 
VI. Conclusions: Policy 
Implications  
From a policy perspective, the complexity of the 
cases suggests that the love affair among 
policymakers with grand governance solutions 
such as decentralization entail a form of magical 
thinking. An underlying assumption of 
decentralization is that local political actors are 
more accountable to their populations and better 
equipped to deliver services than distant 
bureaucrats and policymakers in the capital. 
While this may hold credence in the abstract, 
Iraq’s political marketplaces at the governorate-
level create little if any space for the voice and 
agency of populations, as parties and militias 
have consistently employed various forms of 
violence and cooptation to secure control. 
Rather than relying upon local buy-in through 
service delivery and effective governance, 
political blocs have captured everything from 
local administrative bodies to border crossings 
in order to secure sources of revenue and extend 
patronage networks. In this context, the injection 
of more funds and autonomy into local 
administrations simply accelerates existing 
forms of state capture.  
 
How can reform-minded actors within the GoI 
and international partners work against these 
dynamics and promote public authority in the 
governorates? As demonstrated in each of the 
cases, international militaries and aid 
organizations do not have a promising track 
record in understanding or navigating the 
dynamics of subnational political marketplaces. 
In many cases they have wittingly or unwittingly 
generated destructive, chaotic shifts in local 
competitions over power. Nonetheless, there 
is still significant support across Iraqi civil 
society for international actors to play a role in 
oversight and accountability at the national 
and subnational levels. The international 
community should work with the GoI to 
emphasize accountability mechanisms at the 
governorate level over further devolution of 
powers. Iraq’s Council of Representatives 
(CoR) has already created parliamentary 
committees for each governorate to fulfil 
oversight responsibilities and hold local 
government officials accountable. In the short 
run, representatives of the international 
community (UNAMI, European Union, US, and 
the UK) should work with the CoR and assist 
its governorate committees in fulfilling their 
local oversight responsibilities. In the 
medium-term, provincial elections (delayed 
since 2017) should be held with robust 
international oversight.  
 
In a similar vein, international partners should 
work with the GoI to strengthen formal control 
over international border crossings, ports, and 
oil and gas fields across the Iraqi 
governorates. Currently, revenues from these 
resources are shared between the federal 
authorities and influential parties on the 
ground while local citizens receive little 
benefit. In tandem with anti-corruption efforts 
within the federal institutions, members of the 
international community could provide 
technical assistance and consultations to the 
relevant federal ministries (ministry of 
transportation, oil, and finances) on how to 
strengthen their authority over economic 
assets and resources located at the 
governorates. Unless public authority is 
restored at the local level, providing local 
governorates with greater access to revenues 
from border crossings, ports, and oil revenues 
through decentralization mechanisms would 
only intensify the competition for resources 
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and corruption.  
 
While promoting accountability over local 
administrations and state control over assets 
should be a key policy objective, the GoI and 
international partners must be realistic about 
where this is actually possible on the ground. 
Different governorate-level political marketplaces 
allow for varying levels of engagement. As 
demonstrated, most of Diyala governorate is 
under the tight control of Badr Organization, a 
militia party that has employed systematic 
violence and state capture to dominate the 
province. Realistically, it would be exceedingly 
difficult for the GoI and members of the 
international community to change the course of 
Badr’s actions in Diyala, a governorate seen by 
Iran as a key part of its strategy in Iraq. Some 
analysts have argued that the Kurdish northern 
areas of the province represent the only 
opportunity for international actors to check 
Badr’s total dominance over the entire 
governorate. But even this would be complicated 
as the Kurdish part of Diyala is traditionally a 
support base of the PUK, which has close ties to 
both Iran and the Badr Organization.  
 
Basra is likewise a difficult context for 
engagement and reform, but the presence of a 
strong civil society and protest movement 
provides a potential opening. Mass 
unemployment, largely the result of Shia parties’ 
capture and competition for Basra’s resources, 
are likely to continue generating greater public 
resentments and protests in the future in Basra.  
Realistically, the Shia parties and militias are 
unlikely to abandon their control over the 
governorate’s assets and will continue to contain 
public protests through limited provision of jobs 
and services to strategically located 
groups/tribes and the tactical use of violence. 
But this strategy is already showing signs of 
faltering, particularly in the context of falling oil 
prices and reduced government revenues. 
Moreover, Basra’s protest movement has 
persevered beyond the 2018 government 
crackdown. While it would be difficult to 
influence the Shia parties directly, reform-
minded actors within the GoI and international 
partners should provide support to Basra’s 
civil society activists and organizations to 
bolster their capacity to demand political 
reform and social justice in Basra.  
 
Given the fragmented nature of Nineveh’s 
political marketplace and the presence of a 
wide range of local allegiances (ranging from 
pro-Iran to pro-US political actors), one could 
argue that there is the greatest amount of 
room and flexibility for the GoI and 
international actors to shape local 
governance. The KDP is an enormously 
important actor in Nineveh’s local politics and 
economy and could be pushed to use its 
influence towards better governance in the 
province. Sunni Arab political actors are 
historically willing to cooperate with 
international partners, but the window for 
engagement is closing due to the mass 
injection of funds from Baghdad-based 
political parties during the post-ISIS period. 
Like Basra, arguably the most promising 
political actors within Nineveh are its civil 
society activists, who can be supported to 
better contribute to the reconstruction of 
Nineveh and gain greater influence over local 
governance in the future. From the 
perspective of the international community, 
this would mean devising a strategy based on 
a combination of principle and opportunism, 
devising ways of providing tactical support to 
local allies (especially civic activists) working 
towards reform goals.  
 
The political marketplaces of Basra, Nineveh, 
and Diyala and more broadly that of Iraq as a 
whole are likely to witness turbulent dynamics 
in the short and medium term due to the 
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global crash in oil prices. The parties will be 
forced to rely on non-oil forms of revenue 
generation, which could potentially lead to 
conflict over border crossings, checkpoints, and 
smuggling. As seen in previous oil-related 
economic crashes, the parties and militias have 
used these non-oil alternative forms of political 
finance to maintain patronage networks and 
continue political co-optation, effectively 
increasing their share of power in relation to a 
cash-strapped central government institutions. 
In light of such developments on the horizon, the 
newly installed government and international 
community have ever-contracting options at 
their disposal.
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